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6 Subjectification, syntax, and communication
Arie Verhagen
l Introduction1
The notion of Subjectification has arisen, and is mostly used, in the
context of the study of semantic change through time (cf. Traugott
1989, this volume; Langacker 1990). My purpose in the present chapter
is to apply the notion to certain phenomena of synchronic Variation (in
modern Dutch, but also observable in modern English) which look very
similar to diachronic Subjectification. In particular, I will examine the
use of the predicates promise, threaten, and refuse in Dutch and English,
focussing on the relation between descriptive ('objective') applications
(äs in He promised to defend the constitutiori) and modal ('subjective')
uses (äs in Thursday promises to be a veryfine day. The incident threatened
to ruin his chances).
Whereas some other chapters in this volume (for example, by Eliza-
beth Traugott and Kathleen Carey) discuss details of the conceptual
content of Subjectification, the aim of this chapter is to extend the scope
of this notion to new domains. Therefore I will not be concerned here
with distinctions between different construals of the notion of Subjecti-
fication (important äs the issue may be), but rather Start from what they
have in common.
I will try to show that an approach in terms of Subjectification supplies
us with a coherent conceptual framework for an integrated description
of the use of the predicates mentioned above, provided that we are
willing to take syntactic and discourse analytic considerations into
account äs well. Firstly, I will argue that the semantic analysis implicitly
imposes certain structural differences on subjective versus objective
uses of the verbs involved (which in a language like Dutch correlate with
formal structural differences in certain contexts); thus syntactic con-
siderations turn out to be an integral part of the semantic analysis.
Secondly, a specific way of construing the relationship between subject-
ive and objective uses also appears to shed light on varying uses of
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different syntactic constructions in actual discourse., which in turn seem
to provide motivation for the existence of the constructions.
Thus the goals of this chapter are in one sense restricted, and in
another somewhat ambitious. On the one hand, I will be concerned only
with certain aspects of the use of three words, claiming that their
analysis is properly included in an analysis of subjectification. But on
the other hand, I am trying to justify an Integration of the research
perspectives of semantics, grammar (in particular phrase structure
syntax), and discourse analysis. Put radically: I will be pursuing the idea
that one cannot be an optimal semanticist without also doing syntax and
discourse analysis - with similar comments applying, mutatis mutandis,
to the syntactician and the discourse analyst. The main 'programmatic'
point of this chapter is that these different points of view should be
integrated in a linguistic analysis of subjectification (at least äs a
synchronic phenomenon): semantic, syntactic, and discourse analysis
can each be enriched by Integration.
2 Subjectification of promise
First, let us see why it makes sense to apply the concept of subjectifi-
cation to a verb like promise. Consider the examples in (l)-(4).
(1) Hij beloofde de grondwet te verdedigen
He promised the constitution to defend
'He promised to defend the constitution'
(2) Het debat belooft spannend te worden
The debate promises exciting to become
'The debate promises to be exciting' < ec> (cf. note 1)
(3) Tomorrow promises to be a fine day
(4) Het beloofde een mooie dag te worden
It promised a fine day to become
'It promised to be a fine day'
Sentence (1) (both in Dutch and in English) ascribes an act of promising
to the referent of the subject ('He'); the infinitival complement ('to
defend the constitution') represents the propositional content of the
speech-act being reported. An expectation on the part of the audience
that the referent of 'He' will indeed carry out this activity may thus be
justified by the fact of the commitment undertaken by this referent. The
basis for such an expectation is referred to in the sentence, it is, in the
terminology of Langacker (1990), On-stage'.
Sentence (2), on the other hand, does not ascribe an act of promising
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to the referent of its subject ('The debate'). Any sense of expectation it
induces cannot be justified in terms of something referred to in the
sentence, but must be attributed to a subjective evaluation by the
conceptualiser, who is not referred to in the sentence; he is Off-stage'.
Similar comments apply to the weather-sentences (3) and (4): whether
the subject is a noun or a 'dummy' pronoun, the expectation that it will
be a fine day cannot, in either case, be justified by reference to some-
thing mentioned in the sentence, but must be taken äs a judgement by
the conceptualiser.
The difference between (1) and (2)-(4) can be described in terms of
Subjectification. In terms of Traugott (1989:35), the Interpretation of
the element promise in (2)-(4) is much more 'based in the speaker's
subjective belief state/attitude toward the proposition' than in (1). I
have already used Langacker's (1990) terms Off-stage' and Όη-stage' to
refer to the same difference, and other characterisations by Langacker
also have immediate parallels for these cases. For example, Langacker
describes the subjective meaning in examples like Beyond the 2000 meter
level, the trau {rises/falls/ascends/descends} quite steeply in the following
terms:
The directionality inherent in these latter expressions, and the sense of 'move-
ment' they inspire, can only be attributed to subjective motion by the concep-
tualizer, who traces a mental path by scanning in a particular direction along the
subject's expanse. (p. 19)
And on the 'future senses of "go"' (äs in the French Elle vafermer la
porte}, he comments äs follows:
Observe, for example, that with the spatial reading [i.e. with the Elle moving
through space in the direction of the door - AV] the subject necessarily intends
to carry out the infinitival process. However the temporal reading carries no
such implication - instead we find a generalized conception of imminence or
predictability, such that the Speaker (äs opposed to the subject) foretells the
event's occurrence. (p. 23)
These descriptions allow analogous application to the difference
between example (1) and those in (2)-(4); we may say that the sense of
expectation inspired by (2)—(4) can only be attributed to a subjective
evaluation by the conceptualiser, and that he, rather than the subject of
the sentence, foretells the event's occurrence.2 The fact that these
characterisations - in terms of Traugott äs well äs Langacker - can be
used to describe adequately the meaning differences involved here,
clearly shows that a similar semantic mechanism is involved. That does
not mean that there are no differences between Subjectification of
promise and that of a case like French aller; for example, promise suggests
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evaluation, normally positive. But the notions that are central in the
concept of subjectification carry over directly to promise.
As I said before, I will not be concerned with differences between
details of Traugott's and Langacker's elaborations of the concept of
subjectification, but rather take it äs established that they overlap to a
large extent, and sufficiently so in order to proceed on the assumption
that the discussion to follow is relevant to both approaches. The first
point I want to turn to is that of the relation between subjectification in
verb meaning and syntax.
3 Subjectification and syntax
3.1 Interpretation structure
One of the important features that the characterisations of subjectifi-
cation above have in common is the idea that the two readings differ in
the relations between the verb and the subject of the sentence. In one
case the verb meaning is related directly to the referent of the subject: In
(1), it is effectively taken äs specifying an action emanating from that
referent, or, to put it another way, promise is located in the subject's
sphere of infiuence. In the other cases, there is no such direct relation
between the verb and the subject: In (2)—(4), promise is not located in the
subject's sphere of infiuence (but rather in the conceptualiser's state of
mind). In other words, the semantic characterisation of the difference
between (1) and (2)-{4) in terms of subjectification in fact imposes two
different structures on the Interpretation of the sentences involved: one
with a direct link between verb and subject, the other with no such
direct link.
Another way of showing the structural component of subjectification
in the sentences involved is the following. Sentences like (1), with
promise used objectively, can be paraphrased by means of a series of
answers to gradually more specific questions. The first element of the
sentence is taken äs the answer to the question what the topic of
discussion is, the verb is taken äs an immediate answer to the question
what kind of activity or process the subject originated (which represents
the direct link between subject and verb), and the infinite complement is
taken äs the answer to the question what constituted the content or
object ofthat process. Schematically:
(1)' -'What about?' -He
- 'What did he do?' - promised
- 'What did he promise?'- to defend the constitution'
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Specifically, we can take the element promise on its own äs it denotes a
certain concept independently of other elements in the sentence, and
relate it interpretively to the subject. The idea of 'promise' is conceptua-
lised independently of a particular content of the promise äs an act of a
particular kind, the content of which is only specified subsequently.
Following suggestions by Daalder (1989), and Pardoen (1993, in prepar-
ation), this structural aspect of the interpretation can be depicted
graphically äs a kind of phrase structure (with the condition that it is to
be read from left to right) specifying how the Interpretation of the
sentence is built up gradually, by sequential addition of elements to the
interpretation built up 'so far'. I call such a representation the 'Interpre-
tation structure' of a sentence; for example (l)":3
(1)" He promised to defend the constitution
J _J ' J [
The interpretation structure connected with subjecuve promise is differ-
ent. The finite verb in The debate promises to be exciting cannot be
paraphrased äs an answer to a question of the type 'What did the debate
do?' It cannot be paraphrased äs providing a specification of the subject
independently, for that would amount to describing the sentence äs
stating that the debate made a promise, the propositional content of
which was to be a fine day — and that is utterly inadequate. Rather, an
adequate way of paraphrasing (3) is äs in (3)':
(3)' - 'What about?' - The debate
- 'What about the debate?' - promises to be exciting
The corresponding interpretation structure is given in (3)":
(3)" The debate promises to be exciting
l l l l
It appears that we have to use two different 'schemas' for sentence
interpretation: X-Y-Z and X-Y, the former interpreted äs 'X - What
did X do? -H> Υ - What did X Y? -» Z' (a 'transitive-event-schema'), the
latter äs 'X - What about X? —» Y_' (a 'subject-predicate-schema').
Application of the first schema corresponds to the objective reading of a
verb, for it is taken äs denoting a concept independently of other
elements in the sentence, and construed äs originating from the subject.
The verb in turn assigns the role of promiser to its subject, and may
assign the role of promisee to another participant, both independently of
the contents of the promise. The second schema corresponds to the
subjective reading, in which the verb does not denote a concept that
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could be construed äs independently denoting some activity or process
emanating from the subject; it does not assign roles of promiser and
promisee. The subject is not a promiser, but rather a 'theme' being
located in a certain conceptual space, essentially denoted by the copular
construction, and a promisee is excluded in such cases. In other words,
rather than being conceptualised independently, the verb evaluates the
applicability of the rest of the predicate, i.e. it is a subjective modifier of
the complement. As indicated in (3)", it is only this complex expression
that can be taken äs providing a specification of the subject The debate.
One of the merits of viewing things this way is that it actually
explicates what is different in these cases, rather than merely labelling it
in terms of 'literaP vs. 'figurative' or 'metaphoricaP. This is not,
however, to say that such labels are incorrect, but rather that such
categorisations do not in themselves provide äs much insight äs is both
needed and possible. As will become clear in section 4, the present
approach provides a much better basis for a comprehensive explanatory
analysis of semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic aspects of the phenomena
involved.
3.2 Verb ordering in Dutch subordinate clauses
The concepts introduced so far apply equally to the English and the
Dutch examples. All of the sentences considered so far lack systematic
formal indications for the semantic differences; it is the semantic com-
bination, and (in)compatibilities involved in it, that give rise to one
Interpretation rather than another. In particular, the differences
between the interpretive orderings are not formally indicated in the
linear order of the words. However, in subordinate clauses in Dutch, we
do find a systematic formal distinction. With nominal objects, subord-
inate clauses in Dutch exhibit SOV-order, but with other complements
things are more variable. It is here that we may find different patterns
corresponding to objective versus subjective readings. With objective
readings we typically find patterns of the type S(O)V1-OV2, i.e. with
promise separated from the non-finite verb V2, while with subjective
readings we find S(O)—ViV2, i.e. with the two verbs constituting a
cluster. Consider (5) and (6), which contain subordinate variants of (1)
and (2), respectively.
(5) [Er klonk applaus] wen hij beloofde de grondwet
[There sounded applause] when he promised the constitution
te zullen verdedigen
to shall defend
'[Applause resounded] when he promised to defend the constitition'
Subjectification, syntax, and communication 109
(6) [We gaannaar de Kamer} omdat het debat spannend belooft
[We go to the Chamber] because the debate exciting promises
te worden
to become
'[We will go to the House] because the debate promises to be
exciting'
Note that in (5) beloofde, denoting an act of promising by the subject,
precedes all of the complement, i.e. it precedes the whole specification of
the contents of the promise. But in (6), the predicate nominal precedes
beloofde (which forms a verbal cluster with the copula). In accordance
with the theory of functional word order outlined in Verhagen (1986, to
appear) and especially Pardoen (1993, in preparation), beloofde in (6) is
not conceptualised independently of the predicate nominal 'to be excit-
ing', since the former does not precede the latter (linear precedence
being a necessary condition for independent conceptualisation). So the
element beloofde can only be integrated into the Interpretation of the
entire sentence äs a part of the entire complex 'promise to be exciting' -
which is in fact the reading we need. In cases like these, we may
conclude that there is a formal indication of the interpretative difference
between subjective and objective readings of a verb like beloven, since an
objective reading is conceptually independent of the complement and
may therefore precede it. That is, the linear order in subordinate clauses
provides an indication of the required Interpretation structures;
compare (5)' and (6)' with (1)" and (3)", respectively.
(5)' toen hij beloofde de grondwet te zullen verdedigen
when he promised the constitution to shall defend
l l ' ι '
(6)' omdat het debat spannend beloofde te worden
because the debate exciting promised to become
l l l l
An Interpretation structure of the type in (5)7(1)" is excluded by the
linear order of (6), since in the latter case, the element beloofde is located,
so to speak, in the middle of the complement. Cases like (6) are some-
times described in terms of an assumed syntactic process of clause
union. What I am claiming here is that the occurrence of such a
phenomenon is perfectly understandable in terms of concepts that we
have to use anyhow in a semantic analysis.
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Actually, the relations between form (order) and Interpretation
(objective/subjective) are asymmetric. Clustering is a necessary, but not
a sufficient., condition for a subjective reading of promise (objective use
of the verb is not disallowed in the order (Ο)-νΊν2), while the 'disjoint'
order Vj-OVa imposes an objective reading on the verb (this order is a
sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for an objective reading). This
difference can be exploited in discourse, äs we shall see in section 4; for
the moment, however, we may abstract from this asymmetry.
Another example exhibiting this syntactic phenomenon is (7):
(7) [Er wacht hem een nieuwe taak,] die tijdrovend
[There awaits him a new task,] which time-consuming
belooft te zijn
promises to be
'[He has the prospect of a new task] which promises to be time-
consuming' <ec>
Notice that (7) and the other examples of subjective promise given so far
have infinitival complements denoting states, while the complement of
objective promise in (1) and (5) denotes an activity. This difference in
aspectual type correlates (in terms of frequency) with the difference
between subjective and objective, but what is really crucial is the
relation between the subject and the verb. We do find examples like (8),
with a Stative complement and an objective promise, and also cases like
(9), with a non-stative complement and a subjective promise. What
matters is the nature of the subject; the question is: can it be thought to
be capable of committing itself to actively producing the result specified
in the complement?
(8) Zij beloofde haar moeder een goede verpleegster te worden
She promised her mother a good nurse to become
'She promised her mother to be a good nurse'
(9) De twaalfde Jumping-Amsterdam belooft al zijn
The twelfth Jumping-Amsterdam promises all its
voorgangers te overtreffen
predecessors to surpass
'The 12th Jumping-Amsterdam [tournament] promises to surpass
all its predecessors' < ec >
In fact, an objective Interpretation of (8) is required because of the
presence of 'her mother'. This participant needs a semantic role, and the
only plausible one is that of promisee, which imposes an objective
reading on the verb. Without that participant, the sentence would allow
both a subjective and an objective reading, which confirms that the
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aspectual type of the complement does not itself indicate a particular
construal of the relation between finite verb and subject (a particular
Interpretation structure). In a subordinate clause, however, the Inter-
pretation structure can be reflected linguistically whether a promisee is
present or not. With beloven preceding the entire complement (äs in
(10)), it is construed objectively, while the subjective reading requires
verb-clustering (äs in (11) - the asymmetry in the formulation here
relates to the asymmetry alluded to above).
(10) . . . omdat zij beloofde een goede verpleegster te worden
. . . because she promised a good nurse to become
'. . . because she promised [=made the promise] to be a good
nurse'
(11) . . .omdat zij een goede verpleegster beloofde te worden
. . . because she a good nurse promised to become
'. . . because it looked like she would be a good nurse'
So we seem to have a systematic connection between semantics and
syntax involving Subjectification. The lack of conceptual independence
implied by a subjective construal of a verb requires it to follow non-
verbal elements of its complement in subordinate clauses, i.e. to take the
Position of Vj in the schema S(O)-ViV2 radier than in the Schema
S(0)V1-OV2.
3.3 Extending the description
Before moving on to further questions of explanation, it is useful to
point out that the semantic and syntactic phenomena illustrated above
are not restricted to the verb promise and its Dutch counterpart beloven.
They may also be observed with the (related) verb threaten, Dutch
dreigen. Consider (12)-(14):
(12) De rector dreigde het onderwijs voor onbepaalde
The headmaster threatened the instruction for indefinite
tijd te staken
time to suspend
'The headmaster threatened to suspend teaching for an indefinite
period of time' < ec >
(13) The incident threatened to ruin his chances
(14) Het incident dreigde zijn kansen teniet te doen
The incident threatened his chances to-null to do
'The incident threatened to destroy his chances'
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Sentence (12) reports an act of threatening by the headmaster; i.e.
dreigen, äs well äs threaten in the English translation, is construed
objectively. But threaten and dreigen in (13) and (14) are construed
subjectively, completely parallel to the cases with promise discussed
above. The syntax also works analogously in these cases: subjective
dreigen does not precede the complement, but forms a cluster with the
other, non-finite verb, äs illustrated in (15):
(15) [Het is een
prestigeslag] waarvan vooral de kleuter het
[It is a battle-
of prestige,] where-of for-all the pre-schooler the
slachtoffer dreigt te worden
victim threatens to become
'[This is a fight for prestige,] from which especially small children
threaten to become victims' < ec >
Here, a subjective reading of dreigt is required and the verb may appear
only 'in the middle' of the complement, adjacent to the complement
verb. In an objective reading, however, it is typically separated from the
complement verb, especially when the matrix clause entails that dreigen
must refer to an utterance by its subject (cf, ANS 1984:584). Putting the
verbs in (16) in a cluster would remove the sense that 'he' is actually
uttering threats:
(16) De agent hoorde hoe hij dreigde de gijzelaar neer
The officer heard how he threatened the hostage down
te schielen
to shoot
'The officer heard how he threatened to shoot the hostage'
The verb refuse, Dutch weigeren, exhibits a similar pattern: (17) is a case
of a refusal construed objectively, whereas (18) contains a case of
subjective refuse.4
(17) De President weigerde haar tot premier te benoemen
The president refused her to prime-minister to appoint
'The president refused to appoint her äs prime minister'
(18) De motor weigerde warm te worden
The engine refused warm to become
'The engine refused to get warm'
The syntax seems to work differently here, though. The ordering in
(18)' and that in (18)" allow for a subjective reading, while a subjective
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construal of beloven or dreigen, äs we observed above, does not permit
the second type of ordering:
(18)' . . . dat de motor warm weigerde te worden
. . . that the engine warm refused to become
(18)" . . . dat de motor weigerde warm te worden
. . . that the engine refused warm to become
The most reasonable explanation for this difference seems to be that
weigeren and refuse, unlike beloven and dreigen and their English
counterparts, allow for a subjective reading even without a complement.
In other words, a clause like De motor weigerde ('The engine refused') is
itself a well-formed expression (conveying the message that the engine
did not Start), while phrases like Het debat beloofde ('The debate
promised') and Het incident dreigde ('The incident threatened') simply
do not constitute well-formed expressions by themselves. In principle
then, the difference between subjective and objective construal does not
have to correlate (precisely) with conceptual dependence and indepen-
dence in the case of weigeren, allowing both (18)' and (18)". However, I
will suggest below that in actual usage the difference between beloven
and dreigen on the one hand, and weigeren on the other, is not äs great äs
these intuitive judgements suggest.
In fact, there is another issue which makes the difference smaller than
it might seem - one that will take us into the area of discourse consider-
ations. As I suggested above, there is an asymmetry in the relations
between linear Order and Interpretation. Note that we have in fact two
such relations: one between objective, independent construal of the verb
and its preceding the complement, and one between subjective, non-
independent construal of the verb and its not preceding the com-
plement. As it turns out, the logical properties of the relations are not
exactly the same in the two cases. In the former, the precise Statement of
the relation must be that precedence imposes objective construal, while,
in the latter case, the precise Statement is that subjective construal
requires non-precedence. That is, beloven in its subjective sense may not
precede its complement (*dat het debat beloofde spannend te worden, lit.:
'that the debate promised exciting to become'), but in its objective sense
it does sometimes occur in a verbal cluster, to the right of (part of) the
complement (cf. also ANS 1984:585):
(19) . . . omdat hij het tekort beloofde aan te zuiveren
. . . because he the deficit promised up to make
'. . . because he promised to make up the deficit'
The 'reverse' Situation (putting a case of subjective beloven to the front
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of the complement äs in (20)) always results in the odd reading in which
the subject is assigned the role of promiser:
(20) . . . omdat het debat beloofde spannend te worden
. . . because the debate promised exciting to become
'. . . because the debate promised [=made the promise] to be
exciting'
So the question is: whence this asymmetry? I want to suggest below that
the answer may come from considering the role of the verbs involved, in
both their objective and their subjective senses, in connected discourse.
4 Argumentation and coherence
4.1 Argumentational orientation
Clearly, one wants the different uses of the verbs discussed to be related.
An analysis that would imply the necessity of assuming homonyms of
subjective and obj'ective promise, threaten, and refuse, would surely be
missing a generalisation (to put it mildly). So how could one undertake
an analysis that relates the uses discussed, and still accounts for the
differences? More precisely, how exactly should we conceive of the
mechanism of subjectification in these cases? While we are not discuss-
ing diachronic developments,5 but rather synchronic Variation, it is
still possible to construe the relationship between the two variants in
different ways. Assuming there to be some kind of overlap, there are
still different ways of conceiving what is common and what is distinct.
One way might be to assume that subjectification involves the addition
of subjectivity to the meaning; or it might be construed äs a replaceme.nl
of objectivity by subjectivity while retaining certain structural semantic
features (äs a kind of metaphorical mapping from the domain of
describing reality to the domain of predicting it). Here I want to argue
for another assumption, viz. that the subjective use of promise, threaten,
and refuse is related to the objective use in the sense that it in fact shares
subjective elements of meaning with the objective use, but lacks elements
of objectivity. In other words: what is called objective use does not differ
from subjective use in that subjectivity (of the relevant kind) is lacking,
but rather in that it exhibits a certain descriptive objectivity that is
absent from the subjective use. I will try to argue that the role of the
objective sense of promise, etc. in connected discourse in fact incor-
porates certain features that are definitional of the subjective sense.
The central concept in this approach is argumentation. In a develop-
ing discourse, the Interpreter (short for 'reader or hearer') has a certain
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representation of what the discourse is about, and, in particular, of the
direction it is taking at that precise point in time. A new utterance is
firstly interpreted with respect to bis understanding of the discourse so
far, and then, more importantly, construed äs providing a. coherent next
step in the process of constructing the discourse representation. As is
generally assumed in discourse studies, understanding a discourse is an
incremental process. Coherence may be taken to mean that the Inter-
preter can establish a conceptual link between the segments of a dis-
course (notably clauses), but the link does not, of course, have to be one
that simply continues the direction the discourse was already taking. On
the contrary, a very important coherence relation is that of Contrast (cf.
Spooren, 1989), which in fact involves a reversal of the direction a
discourse is taking.6 It is useful to elaborate this point somewhat further
before discussing how promise, threaten, and refuse fit into this frame-
work. Consider Ά simple case like (21).
(21) This room has a nice view, but it is very expensive.
In terms of incremental discourse understanding, this sequence can be
analysed äs follows. The first clause contains information supporting the
conclusion that the room should be hired. It counts äs an argument
towards conclusions of that type, so by the end of that clause it has
oriented the Interpreter towards such a conclusion. Then the next
segment arrives, introduced by but, and this contains information sup-
porting the opposite conclusion that the room should not be hired. At
the end of that clause, the Interpreter is oriented towards the latter type
of conclusion (in terms of Spooren (1989) the orientation of the second
clause in a pair connected by but is dominant). So whatever the position
of the (assumed) producer of the discourse at the beginning of his
utterance (or, for that matter, at the end), the sequence of discourse
segments provides a series of argumentational Steps, first orienting an
Interpreter towards a positive conclusion, and then subsequently rever-
sing it.
Anscombre and Ducrot (1989) emphasise that many ordinary expres-
sions in natural languages have the function of orienting an Interpreter,
at the point in the discourse where they occur, towards conclusions of a
particular type. Everyday expressions like expensive, tall, etc., have
some particular argumentational force, and are never (in their terms)
'purely' informative. One can make 'purely' descriptive phrases, like
costs £50 and is l .80m, but they must be constructed ad hoc, and in an
everyday discourse an Interpreter must still find out (in some other way)
whether these are to count äs (respectively) expensive and tall or not
before he knows what he can do with the information. This illustrates
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that the presence of some argumentational orientation is the default
Situation in natural language, 'pure' informativity being the exception.7
Now notice that the report of an act of promising, at the point in the
discourse where it is reported, also has a certain argumentational force.
That is, it does not merely describe an event, it also Orients the Inter-
preter towards conclusions of a particular type. The report that someone
promised X counts äs an argument in favour of the conclusion that X
will occur; it strengthens the assumption that X will actually happen.
Consider the exchange in (22).
(22) A: Is Peter coming to the party?
B: Sure — he promised.
Interpreting B's utterance coherently requires taking the report of
Peter's promise to come äs an argument supporting the conclusion that
he will indeed come, and such an Interpretation is in fact established
automatically. This view is confirmed when we consider the use of
connectives like so and but, which mark argumentational relations
between discourse Segments in an explicit way. Consider (22a and b) äs
alternative answers to A's query in (22):
(22) a. He promised to come, so_ he could be here any minute
b. He promised to come, but I'm not entirely confident
So marks the next step in the Interpretation of a discourse äs a conclu-
sion licensed by the previous segment, so the naturalness of (22a)
confirms the idea that the report of his promise to come counts äs an
argument for the conclusion that he will in fact come. In (22b), the first
segment of course Orients the addressee towards precisely the same
conclusion, and this explains why in this case the next step, reversing
the argumentational orientation, is introduced by the contrastive con-
nective but.
It should be stressed once more that this analysis is in no way
intended to reflect the conceptualiser's mental state in the production of
the utterance - it is quite conceivable (perhaps even natural) that B has
reached the conclusion that Peter will not be coming to the party even
before A asks the question. Rather, what is at stake is the route, that is,
the successive Steps, by which the producer of the discourse is trying to
change the cognitive state of the addressee, in other words, the way
communication is taking place.
- -This perspective on the function of promise in connected discourse is
also corroborated by the behaviour of linguistic elements that weaken
the argumentational force of an expression (argumentational operators
in the sense of Anscombre and Ducrot 1989). For example, introducing
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a Statement with Well and/or uttering it with a somewhat rising into-
nation, has the effect of weakening the force with which the addressee is
oriented towards the relevant conclusions (compare Well, the room has a
nice view . . .).8
(23) A: Is Peter coming to the party?
B: Well - he promised . . .
Having an operator change the argumentational force of an expression
presupposes that the expression has a particular force to begin with.
Furthermore, notice that the direction of the argumentational orienta-
tion is not changed. In terms of incremental Interpretation of the
discourse, the addressee is oriented towards the same type of conclu-
sions at the end of B's utterance in (23) äs was the case in (22) (albeit
with less force). Thus, the same pattern of use of connectives shows up
here äs in (22a and b):
(23) a. Well - he promised to come, .so l guess he might be here any minute
b. Well — he promised to come, but you know Peter: he might just
forget
The use ofpromise not only counts äs strengthening the assumption that
the event denoted by the complement of the verb will occur, it also
indicates a positive evaluation of this event (in other words, the dis-
course Orients the addressee towards a positive evaluation). The second
segment in (24) is explicitly positive and it is introduced by so, which
illustrates that the first segment, with promise, does have a positive
orientation. This is also confirmed by the fact that in (25), a clearly
negative second segment is introduced by but:9
(24) A: Is Peter coming to the party?
B: He promised,· 50 let's hope he'll be on time
(25) A: Is Peter coming to the party?
B: He promised; but I wouldn't care if he changed his mind
Thus we have suggested a particular answer to the question 'What is the
function ofpromise in communication?' that is, 'How does it contribute
to changing the cognitive state of an Interpreter in an ongoing dis-
course?' The answer consists of two parts: first, at the point in the
discourse where it occurs, promise counts äs strengthening some
assumption (given contextually and/or denoted by the complement) that
a certain event will actually occur; second, it indicates positive evalu-
ation of this event.
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Note now that the subjective use of promise shows exactly the same
argumentational orientation, in both respects. Uttering Tomorrow
promises to be afine day Orients the addressee towards the conclusion that
it will actually be a fine day, and it is also clear that this is evaluated
positively. In fact, this describes the function of the verb in such a case
exhaustively. In its subjective use, orienting the Interpreter towards
expecting the event denoted in the complement and indicating positive
evaluation is all that the verb contributes to the meaning of the sentence.
In its objective use it does the same. But it also does something eise;
namely reporting a particular event, i.e. the act of promising performed
by the referent of the subject (which justifies the argumentational
orientation). It is precisely this aspect of the denotation of an indepen-
dently conceptualised event that is lacking in the subjective use (and
that we therefore still invoke äs motivation for calling this use 'sub-
jective').
So I am suggesting that from the point of view of argumentation (in
incrementally interpreting a discourse), objective and subjective uses do
not really differ. The difference is rather that in the objective uses
evidence for the argumentational orientation is given in the sentence
itself, while in the subjective uses it is not. This amounts to assuming
that subjectification in these cases can be construed äs a lack of objective
features: 'subjective' and Objective' use share features of subjectivity,
but it is the former only that is purely subjective.
Notice that we have now constructed a conceptual asymmetry between
subjective and objective senses of the verbs: semantic aspects of the
objective sense are lacking in the subjective sense, but not vice versa. We
will see later how this may serve äs the basis for explaining the syntactic
asymmetry noted at the end of section 3.3. But first, let us extend the
analysis in this section to threaten and refuse. This can in fact be done in
a straightforward manner.
Note that threaten is parallel to promise in that it also strengthens a
(contextually given) assumption. Exchanges like those in (26) and (27)
are exactly parallel to those given above for promise:
(26) A: Are they really going to freeze the budget?
B: Well, they did threaten to do so.
(27) a. He threatened to come, sä be prepared that he could appear any
minute
b. He threatened to fire us, but things might not be äs black äs they
look
So, like the use of promise, the use of threaten at a particular point in a
discourse Orients the Interpreter towards the conclusion that some event
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will actually come about. But, unlike promise, threaten indicates nega-
tive, rather than positive evaluation (the conclusion drawn from the first
segment in (27a) is a warning; the second segment in (27b) suggests
reassurance given to contrast with the first segment which is clearly
evaluated negatively). The use of threaten in an example like The
incident threatened to ruin his chances shares the argumentational orienta-
tion with the objective uses, while lacking the denotation of an indepen-
dently conceptualised event justifying the conclusion indicated.
The verb refuse displays an argumentational orientation opposite to
both promise and threaten, in that it decreases the strength of an assump-
tion, in particular one that would otherwise be expected to come true.
Again, this can be demonstrated in a manner similar to the discussion of
promise and threaten above. Consider (28) and (29):10
(28) A: Would John acce.pt a decoration?
B: Definitely not — he has always refused one
(29) a. He refuses to come, so we will have to do without him
b. Sofar he has refused to come, but he might have a surprisefor us
Again, the subjective sense of refuse äs in The engine refused to get warm,
shares precisely the same argumentational orientation with the objective
sense. The subjective sense is exhausted by this argumentational orien-
tation, while the objective sense additionally denotes an independently
conceptualised event justifying the relevant conclusion. Thus, the
analysis of both threaten and refuse can clearly proceed along the same
lines äs that of promise.
This approach not only has the advantage that it provides an integrated
analysis of objective and subjective senses of the same verbs; it also puts
some other issues in a new light. For example, at least beloven in Dutch is
sometimes also used in an Objective' sense which nevertheless does not
report an actual act of promising. Consider the following fragment:
(30) 'Gelukkig gaan zulke galbulten vaak vanzelf weer weg.'
'Maar als u niet weet hoe ik er άάη körn, hoe kan ik er dan äfkörnen?'
merkte Annelies op.
'Wacht maar af, beloofde ik haar. 'Je krijgt tabletten van me.'
'Fortunately, such hives often just disappear spontaneously.'
'But if you don't know how I got them, how can I get rid of
them?', Annelies observed.
'Just wait and see', I promised her. 'You'll get tablets from me.'
< ec: margri 8-5-6-cgbl >
An approach according to which Objective' promise would denote a
particular type of commissive speech-act only would have difficulty
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analysing the expression 'Just wait and see,' I promised her, for the
doctor's utterance Just wait and see would in itself count äs an instruc-
tion, or perhaps an advice, but not at all äs a promise. In the context,
however, it is obvious that the relevance of the entire expression is that
the reader should understand that confidence in a good outcome is
justified: a contextually given assumption should be strengthened. In
actual discourse, such a difference between what the referent of a
subject (whether also 'first person' or not) strictly speaking can commit
himself ίο, and what he ultimately wants his addressee to conclude, is
not rare at all (compare routine utterances like He won't come back — I
promise/she promised). As another example, consider the following text
from an advertisement for a firm transporting parcels, in which a third
person is introduced, recommending this firm in the following way:
(31) 'Ze weten dat het vertrouwelijk is.
Echt, je kunt dit met een gerust hart aan ze toevertrouwen.




'They know it is confidential.
Really, you can safely trust them with this.




The alleged Speaker does not commit himself to deliver the parcels well
and fast, äs is made abundantly clear by the Statement from the Company
(outside the quotation marks) following the text cited: Wij doen wat u
belooft ('WH do what you promise'). Still, the text äs produced is not at all
deviant, so that we may once more conclude that this use of beloven
simply counts äs an attempt to strengthen the addressee's belief in a
positive result.
Related to the previous point is the following. According to our
analysis the difference between first-person present tense use of promise
(so-called performative use) and its use in other grammatical contexts
(for example, third person, and/or past tense) is only a matter of degree.
Both aim at a change in the cognitive state of the Interpreter, resulting in
a certain expectation being strengthened; the direction of the argu-
mentational orientation is the same (though not its force). Thus they do
not belong to completely distinct categories of communication. In
view of the fact that the linguistic expression of performative and non-
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performative promise overlap to a very large extern, I find this con-
sequence attractive.
Finally, the approach sketched above also allows us to explain why it is
that an utterance of / threaten does not count äs the performance of an
illocutionary act in the way I promise does, and in fact sounds Strange.
Suppose we assume, contrary to what I am claiming here, that the
negative evaluation of the complement of threaten is actually an object-
oriented radier than a speaker/hearer-oriented feature; i.e. that it is
evaluated negatively from the point of view of an (explicit or implicit)
person threatened, rather than from the point of view of Speaker and
addressee. Then it would remain unclear why it is that it is stränge to say
something like / threaten to ruinyour party, for why couldn't I say that I
was going to do something that is evaluated negatively by someone eise
(for example you)? But this is explained easily under the assumption
that it is the Speaker who Orients the addressee towards a negative
evaluation of the complement-event: committing oneself to something
while at the same time judging this undesirable amounts to inconsist-
ency, at least communicatively.
We may take the fact that the approach proposed here allows for such
generalisations and explanations äs additional evidence that it is correct
to attribute features of subjectivity to so-called objective senses of the
verbs involved too.
4.2 Discourse coherence
As pointed out above, our analysis entails a conceptual asymmetry
between subjective and objective senses of the verbs: semantic aspects of
the objective sense are lacking in the subjective sense, but not vice versa.
The objective sense, unlike the subjective one, denotes some indepen-
dently conceptualised event that justifies the argumentational orienta-
tion. Now can we relate this conceptual asymmetry to the syntactic
asymmetry observed in section 3.3?
In the subjective sense, the verb does not denote an independently
conceptualised event, and serves only to indicate a particular argu-
mentational orientation. In the objective sense it both indicates some
argumentational orientation and denotes an independently conceptua-
lised event. But it might very well be, in a specific context, that the fact
of someone actually performing an act of, say, threatening, is not at all
relevant, that the speaker/writer is actually concerned only with the
conclusions suggested by the sentence, i.e. the consequences of the act,
rather than its being an act of threatening. In our analysis, objective and
subjective senses share features that exhaustively characterise subjec-
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tivity, while the objective sense also has some additional features. We
might expect, then, that both senses also share the syntactic possibilities
that are specific for the subjective sense, with the objective sense having
additional possibilities. More specifically, we may expect that when the
verbs in their objective sense show up in final position (in the pattern
S(O)-ViV2, characterising Vj äs not conceptualised independently of
the complement), they do not constitute a possible separate step in the
reasoning developed in the discourse at that point.
It is hard, if not impossible, to explicate the linguistic content of this
argument in vacuo; so let us turn to an actual example, both in Order to
make the argument more concrete and to provide evidence for it.
Consider the clause in (32), and the fragment it is taken from in (33).
(32) Wanneer de ans de vrouw weigert te helpen
When the doctor the woman refuses to help
'When the doctor denies the woman treatment'
(33) Steeds meer vrouwen die ongewenst zwanger zijn geraakt, wenden zieh
tot de NVSH-consultatiebureaus om hulp. Of die hulp gegeven wordt
is afhankelijk van de instelling van de arts. Wanneer de arts van het
consultatiebureau de vrouw weigert te helpen, kan zij zieh nog wenden
tot de afdeling hulpverlening van het centraal bureau van de NVSH.
De hulpverlening bij ongewenste zwangerschap is pas dit jaar op
gang gekomen. [. . .]
'More and more women who have become pregnant unwantedly,
turn to the NVSH clinics for help. Whether aid is supplied or not
depends on the doctor's attitude. When the doctor of the clinic
denies the woman treatment, she may still turn to the support
department of the central bureau of the NVSH.
Assistance in case of unwanted pregnancy has only just started
this year. [. . .]' <ec: sextan 12-12-8-cgbl >
Sentence (32) contains an occurrence of the verb weigeren ('to refuse')
that describes an act of refusal by a doctor, but in the position that is
characteristic for subjective use. However, it does not refer to a par-
ticular act by one particular doctor. More importantly, äs is evident
from (33), the sentence follows the remark that the help a woman will
get 'depends on the doctor's attitude', and is followed by a description of
what she can do in case she does not get help from a doctor (she may
then turn to the central bureau). The point that some doctor might
perform an act of refusal is not communicatively important here, but the
conclusion that äs a consequence of such a refusal a woman might not
get help, clearly is. The entire text is about the question of women
getting help, and the non-independent position of the verb denoting a
Subjectification, syntax, and communication 123
doctor's refusal guarantees that this main thread of the discourse is not
broken in this particular clause. Even while denoting an act of refusal,
the sole function of the verb in this context is to evoke the conclusion
that a woman might sometimes not get the help she needs in order to
allow the text to continue with a discussion of how that problem (not the
problem of the doctor's refusal) might be resolved.
Similarly, (34) displays clustering of a verb denoting an act performed
by the subject (in this case, threatening):
(34) nu religieus Scherpenzeel hier een persoonlijke rel van
now religious Scherpenzeel here a personal fight of
dreigt te maken
threatens to make
'now that [the] religious [party of ] Scherpenzeel threatens to turn
this into a personal dispute'
This occurs in a context where it is the consequences radier than the act
äs such that constitute the topic of the discussion (cf. (35): there is a
conflict between two Labour Party officials. The first, De Jonge, has
been discharged äs alderman of the town of Scherpenzeel by his own
party under the leadership of the second. Van Bruggen; the latter also
became the new alderman, while the religious party had wanted De
Jonge to keep this position).11
(35) Of zijn 'Fatsoen' het zwaarstwegende argument voor zijn partijge-
noten was hem zondermeer uit te rangeren, vooral nu religieus Scher-
penzeel hier een persoonlijke rel van dreigt te maken? De Jonge:
'natuurlijk moesten er ook nag een paar nieuwelingen op die lijst, van
die jonge snuiters. Die begonnen al direct van de hoge toren af te
blazen, meer openbare schalen en zo.'
v. Bruggen: 'Er is niets aan de hand, ze hebben het allemaalverschrik-
kelijk zitten opblazen. De Jonge heeft een denkfaul gemaakt; op die
bewuste partijvergadering heeft hij me over dat geritsel met die
papieren verteld dat-ie er uiteindelijk hetzelfde over dacht als ik. De
zaak is trouwens weer voor mekaar. Hij heeft ans een briefje geschreven
met de beste wensen voor het nieuwe gemeentebestuur.'
'Whether his "Decency" was the most important argument for his
fellow party-members to put him off side, especially now that the
religious party of Scherpenzeel threatens to turn this into a personal
dispute? De Jonge: "Of course a couple of newcomers had to be on
the list äs well, those young customers. They immediately began
beating the drums, you know, more public schools and things like
that."
v. Bruggen: "There is really nothing the matter, they've all been
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exaggerating tremendously. De Jonge made an error; in that
particular party meeting he told me about this rustling with
those papers, that he ultimately feit the same about it äs I
did. Anyway, the case has been settled. He wrote us a note,
wishing us the best with the new city council.'" <ec: vne
12-9-3-cobl>
Note that in the text following (34) neither of the interviewees discusses
the acts of the religious party in Schwerpenzeel; for what counts is the
possible consequences for the positions of the old and new aldermen.
Van Bruggen (the second interviewee) in particular suggests that a real
dispute has actually been prevented, and he ends with the conclusion
that 'things have been settled'. Clearly then, what the interviewees (are
reported to) respond to is the issue of a threatening dispute, not an act of
threatening to create a dispute - which fits the non-independent Status
of 'refuse' in the actual Order of (34).
These cases can be contrasted with examples such äs (36), occurring
in the context (37).
(36) [Ik moet hem drie keer opbellen,]
'[I have to call him three times,]'
omdat hij weigert zijn bed uit te körnen [en onze twee hinderen naar
school te helpen]
because he refuses his bed out to come [and our two children to
school to help]
'because he refuses to get out of bed and help our two children to
get to school'
(37) Haalje echter niet in je hoofd dat ik thuis de broek aan heb, die heeft
mijn man. Zelfs toen ik hem de bons gaf, betaalde hij me mijn
huishoudgeld en de huishoudrekening, al wist ik dat het geld uit de
zaak kwam. Ik ben geen voorvechtster van vrouwengelijkheid. Ik
geloof niet in dat soort onzin. Ik mag dan ettelijke keren meer ver-
dienen dan mijn echtgenoot, dat maakt me nog niet de baas in huis. Als
we echter naar kantoor gaan, zal hij toch precies moeten doen wat ik
zeg. Als ik 's morgens heel vroeg weg moet, is het geen doen als ik hem
vanafde zaak drie keer op moet bellen, omdat hij weigert zijn bed uit te
körnen en onze twee hinderen naar school te helpen.
'But don't imagine that I'm in Charge at home, for my husband is.
Even when I brushed him off, he paid me my allowance and the
" bills, even though I knew the money came from the Company. I'm
not a fighter for women's equality. I don't believe in that kind of
nonsense. I may make several times more money than my husband,
that still doesn't make me the boss at home. But when we go to
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work, he'll just have to do exactly what I teil him. When I have to
be away very early in the morning, it's just impossible when I
have to call him from the office three times, because he refuses to
get out of bed and help our two children to get to school.' <ec:
libell 15-5^-cgbl>
This fragment stems from an interview with a woman about the distri-
bution of responsibilities between her and her husband at hörne. In this
case, the conclusion that the children might not get to school is just an
example of the important things that might go wrong if the husband does
not do what his wife teils him to do. The sentence very strongly makes
the point that the husband is fully responsible for such behaviour and its
consequences. It is this type of behaviour - behaviour of refusing - that
is the topic of the woman's discourse here: the husband shouldn't
exhibit behaviour ofthat type. So here too, the position of the verb, this
time allowing for independent conceptualisation, is entirely coherent
with the overall character of the discourse.
Thus, not only is the conceptual asymmetry we have argued for
further confirmed by the fact that the syntactic asymmetry runs parallel,
but examination of actual occurrences of the different orderings in their
contexts also supports our proposal on the precise nature of the asym-
metry. Sometimes the subjective element present even in Objective'
senses of the verbs (that of orienting an Interpreter towards conclusions
of a particular type at a particular point in a discourse) completely
outweighs the denotation of a speech-act.
5 Conclusion
In the preceding sections we have been adopting points of view in
linguistic analysis that are not frequently integrated fully: semantic
(how to describe the relation between different senses of the verbs
promise, threaten, and refusei), syntactic (how to explain the different
ordering possibilities - in Dutch - of these verbs in subordinate
clauses?), and discourse analytic (how to analyse the communicative
function of both the verbs themselves, and the different syntactic pat-
terns that they occur in?). In each case, the analysis derived Support from
considerations arising within other perspectives; within each perspec-
tive taken in isolation, the analysis does not stand äs strong äs on the
level where these analytic perspectives are integrated. Precisely the fact
that Integration of these perspectives allows for deeper understanding of
the phenomena involved in turn constitutes a strong argument for a view
of language that makes such an Integration natural. Speaker/hearer-
subjectivity appears to be one very important concept encompassing
semantics, syntax, and communication.
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NOTES
1 This chapter has profited from responses by the participants in the Cam-
bridge Seminar on Language, Subjectivity, and Subjectivisation. In par-
ticular, I want to thank Elizabeth Traugott for very useful comments on
another presentation of some of these ideas, and Saskia van As, Frank
Jansen, and Ted Sanders for comments on a draft Version. Naturally, I am
solely responsible for any remaining errors. One of the main sources for this
research has been the so-called Eindhoven Corpus (Uit den Boogaart 1975),
in the version available from the Free University in Amsterdam; examples
that stem from that corpus are marked with 'ec'. Terms like conceptualiser,
addressee, etc., and pronouns referring to them, are to be read äs indications
of roles and functions, and thus gender-neutral.
2 Note that in (1) and (2), the difference between objective and subjective
corresponds with, respectively, past and present tense. In the corpus used
for this study, this is evidently a frequent correlation (not an obligatory one;
cf. (4)), and one which seems only natural, given the nature of 'reporting'
inherent in the past tense, and the connection between subjectivity and the
'here-and-now'. I hope to come back to this issue elsewhere, äs well äs to
other issues - for example, the facts that the distribution of negation and
adverbials differs in the two types of constructions, that asking Why? in
response to an objective case of promise means asking for the subject's
motives for promising, whereas it means asking for the conceptualiser's
motives for his utterance in a subjective case, etcetera. Here, I confine myself
to issues immediately relevant to the main topic.
3 For the view of phrase structure äs a way to divide a clause in pieces that can
each be construed äs an answer to a question based on the preceding part, see
Winter (1982). The leftward orientation of the lines connecting a unit to a
preceding one in the Interpretation structure is intended to indicate the
incremental nature of Interpretation. The structure is to be read äs a result of
a series of Steps: (1) Interpretation of He (possibly with respect to context);
(2) Interpretation of promised, joining it with the result of step 1; (3) Inter-
pretation of to defend the constitution, joining it with the result of Step 2, i.e.
with the Interpretation for He promised. The unit used in Step 3 can itself also
be viewed äs the result of a series of interpretative Steps, i.e. äs having
internal structure (see also Daalder 1989, Pardoen 1993, in preparation), but
this is not relevant for present purposes. For other applications, see the
references cited, and Verhagen (1993; to appear).
4 The fact that in Dutch one does not normally hear things like Het weer
weigerde op te knappen ('The weather refused to get better'), even though it
does not sound impossible, might be attributable to the existence of niet
willen ('not want to') äs a Standard way of expressing such messages, äs in
Het weer wilde maar niet opknappen ('The weather wouldn't get any
better').
5 In this particular case, it seems plausible that the subjective uses of the verbs
are later than the objective ones. Cf. Traugott (1993).
6 Cf. Sanders et al. (1992), for a discussion of several types of fundamental
coherence relations.
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7 See also N01ke (1992) for an introduction into the theory of linguistic
argumentation by Ducrot and Anscombre. Another approach that is worth
mentioning here is that of Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986),
since this is also explicitly concerned with mechanisms by which inferences
are licensed. Especially their notion of 'strengthening of an (accessible)
assumption' seems to be applicable to at least some of the issues raised in this
chapter; on a theoretical level, it is not clear though, that their views are
compatible with the other theoretical approaches mentioned in the text.
8 These brief remarks, of course, in no way constitute an analysis of the
meaning of particles like well. I only use them here äs evidence for the
applicability of the concept of argumentation.
9 The (conceptual) presence of a promisee allows for differences between
evaluation by the conceptualiser and by the promisee. Imagine the sentence
Johnpromised his mother to be home early being produced äs an explanation of
John's leaving early by someone who actually regrets this event. Then the
event is presented äs positive for the promisee, but less so with respect to
producer and addressee. Similarly, a particular event may also be interpreted
äs negative for the promisee, but positive from the point of view of the
promiser (and the conceptualiser), äs in Shepromised (him) to make him regret
his unfaithfulness for the rest of his life. Without a promisee, the addressee is
generally oriented towards a positive evaluation of the event unequivocally.
10 Whether evaluation plays a role in the argumentational orientation of refuse
is not so clear. The naturalness of both (i) and (ii) suggests that it does not:
(i) Unfortunately, he refuses to accept my invitation
(ii) Fortunately, he still refuses to betray the hiding-place of his comrades
On the other hand, especially subjective use of weigeren seems to suggest that
the thing not happening is something desirable (cf. the presupposition with
the objective use, that the act refused had actually been requested from the
subject). It is somewhat stränge to say something like Fortunately, the engine
refused taget warm. This implies two subjects of consciousness: one evaluat-
ing the event negatively (for refuse), and one evaluating it positively (for
fortunately).
111 want to thank Luuk Lagerwerf for helping me find out the context of this
particular fragment.
REFERENCES
ANS 1984. Algemene Nederlandse Spraakkunst. Onder redactie van G. Geerts,
W. Haeseryn, J. de Rooij, M. C. van den Toorn. Groningen/Leuven:
Wolters-Noordhoff.
Anscombre, J. and O. Ducrot. 1989. Argumentavity and informativity, in M.
Meyer, ed., From Metaphysics to Rhetoric. Dordrecht/Boston/London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 71-87.
Daalder, S. 1989. Continuative relative clauses, in N. Reiter, ed., Sprechen und
Hören. Akten des 23. Linguistischen Kolloquiums. Tübingen: Niemeyer,
pp. 195-207.
Kirsner, R. S. ed., 1993. The Low Countries andBeyond. Lanham, MD: Univer-
sity Press of America.
128 Arie Verhagen
Langacker, R. W. 1990. Subjectification. Cognitive Linguistics 1:5-38.
Nelke, H. 1992. Semantic constraints on argumentation: from polyphonic
micro-structure to argumentative macro-structure, in F. H. van Eemeren
et al., eds., Argumentation Illuminated. Amsterdam: Sicsat, pp. 189-200.
Pardoen, J. A. 1993. The word order of final verbal elements in Dutch: free
Variation or meaningful organization? In Kirsner, ed., 1993, pp. 71-83.
In preparation. Werkwoorden en volgorde.
Sanders, T. J. M., W. P. M. S. Spooren, and L. G. M. Noordman. 1992.
Toward a taxonomy of coherence relations. Discourse Processes 15:1—35.
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. 1986. Relevance. Communication and Cognition.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Spooren, W. P. M. S. 1989. Some Aspects of the Form and Interpretation of Global
Contrastive Coherence Relations. Enschede: Sneldruk.
Traugott, E. C. 1989. On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: an example
of Subjectification in semantic change. Language 65:31—55.
1993. The conflict PROMISES/THREATENS to escalate into war, in J. S. Günter,
B. A. Kaiser, and C. C. Zoll, eds., Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual
Meeting ofthe Berkeley Linguistics Society. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Linguis-
tics Society, pp. 348-58.
Uit den Boogaart, P. C., ed., 1975. Woordfrequenties in geschreven en gesproken
Nederlands. Utrecht: Oosthoek, Scheltema & Holkema.
Verhagen, A. 1986. Linguistic Theory and the Function of Word Order in Dutch.
Dordrecht: Foris.
1993. The inflection of adjectives with nominal infinitives, in Kirsner, ed.,
1993, pp. 97-109.
to appear. Sequential conceptualization and linear order, in E. H. Casad, ed.,
Cognitive Linguistics in the Redwoods. Berlin, etc.; Mouton de Gruyter.
Winter, E. O. 1982. Towards a Contextual Grammar of English. The Clause and
its Place in the Definition of Sentence. London: George Allen and Unwin.
